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STATE OF UTAH 
JlOHl\1~ L. PETERS, 
Plaiutiff and Appellant 
-vs.- Case No. 10059 
Y II\( il XL\ PETERS, 
Defewl a 11t-Rcspondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
~T.\TE~lENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Thi~ is an appeal from a decision of the District 
Court of the Second District before Hon. Parley E. Nor-
~dh, in which Plaintiff's complaint for divorce was dis-
missed and Defendant granted a decree of divorce on her 
eountPrelaim. Defendant was awarded $2500.00 in lieu 
of alimony, together with $350.00 counsel fees for the use 
and benefit of her attorney. 
DISPOSITIOX IX LOvVER COURT 
Plaintiff and appellant herein filed an action for 
divorce on the ~Sth day of October 1963 (R-2) together 
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with an order to show cause, why Defendant should not 
remove herself from the home of Plaintiff and Defendant 
together with a restraining order enjoining and restrain-
ing Defendant from returning to her home and from har-
assing or annoying Plaintiff or the adopted daughter 
of both Plaintiff and Defendant (R.. 3) and a citation 
directed to Defendant (R. 12). Defendant, thereafter filed 
an answer and counterclaim (It-4) and a motion to va-
cate the restraining order and order to show cause and 
for an order for temporary alimony and attorney fees 
(R-6). Because of the manifest unfairness of the re-
straining order having been issued enjoining Defendant 
from returning home after she had left in the morning 
and was served at her work, without her having an oppor-
tunity to be heard before the issuance of such an order, 
the Defendant filed an affidavit of prejudice. 
The matter was on November 4, 1963 transferred to 
Judge N orseth's division. He immediately vacated the 
restraining order and ordered Defendant to occupy the 
home with Plaintiff, and ordered Plaintiff to pay Defend-
ant $50.00 as temporary alimony and set the time for 
trial for November 13, 1964 at 1 P.M. (R. 10) Defendant 
thereupon, with leave of Court filed an amended counter-
claim (R. 11). 
On November 18, 1963 a trial was had and the matter 
submitted and the 'Court instructed counsel to submit 
written briefs (R. 14). Although Defendant submitted 
her brief within the required ten day period (R. 17) 
Plaintiff at no time filed a brief. 
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On l>t·<'PllllH•r lS, 1963, Judge Norseth rendered his 
mt-mornmlum dPeision (R. :20) and thereafter, in accord-
lUH't' with tlw memo rand tun, on the 3rd day of January 
19ti-l, finding-::-; of fact and conclusions of law (R. 21) and 
a dt•ert·(' of divoreP (R. 22) were made and entered and 
a nwmorandmn of costs filed (R. 15). By its provisions 
Plaintit't''s complaint wa~ dis1nissed and Defendant 
awarded a dPen•e of divorce on her counterclaim. The 
real property standing in the joint names of the parties 
wa::-; awarded to Plaintiff; the personal property which 
Paeh ot' the partiP~ had at the time of the marriage was 
nwarded to Paeh of them respectively. The Defendant 
was awarded a smn of $2500.00 in lieu of alimony to-
~l'tlwr with $350.00 as counsel fees for the use and 
bt'net'it of Plaintiff's attorney. 
On January 7th, 1964, Messrs. Clayton & Gould were 
:-;uh:-;titukd as counsel for Plaintiff in place of Messrs. 
Hit·hanb, Alsup & Richards. (R. 23) 
Dt'fendant thereupon caused to be issued a writ of 
PXt'eution and garnishment (R. 2±, 25, 26) and on the 
1-lth day of January, 1964, plaintiff filed notice of appeal 
~R. :27 ). 
On February 5, 196-±, and before the transcript and 
record had gone to the Supreme Court, Defendant filed 
a petition for te1nporary alimony, pending the disposi-
tion of the action in the higher Court, and for an attor-
Dl'y·~ t\•e in accordance with Sec. 30-3-3, Utah Code 
.Annotah·d. for the preparation and presentation of De-
fl'lhlant'~ defense in the Supreme Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and appellant herein seeks to reverse the 
ruling of the trial 'Court and grant hiln a divorce and 
particularly to relieve him from having to pay out any 
money, either in lieu of alimony or as attorney's fees 
and to turn Defendant out of the marriage empty handed. 
Appellant further appeals from the trial court's order 
awarding temporary alimony and attorney's fees for 
respondent's counsel in the Supreme Court. 
S:TATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on the 6th day of N ovem-
ber, 1961, at Preston, Idaho. Both parties had been 
married before. Appellant had living in his home a young 
woman named J acklyn Peters, but appellant and his 
former wife had not adopted the girl. (Tr. 6) 
Prior to the marriage appellant persuaded respond-
ent to sign an antinuptial agreement which was intro-
duced in evidence . (R. 16) 
About 15 months after the marriage the parties had 
trouble and Plaintiff and appellant brought an action 
for divorce against Defendant and Respondent and on 
February 13, 1964 a decree was entered in favor of 
Plaintiff and against Defendant (Tr. 8). By its terms 
nothing was awarded to Defendant by a default. Later, 
on the 14th day of May, 1963, this Decree of Divorce was 
set aside ('Tr. 35). 
Evidence was introduced of a deed to the home 
which the parties occupied dated March 9, 1962 (Tr. 36). 
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~\ ppt~llant u.nd HPspondent took title to the property as 
joint tPnants. On April :2:2nd, 1963 and prior to the set-
tin~ u~idt· of tlw Deere(• of Divorce, :Mrs. Peters, Re-
~poJldt·nt, eonvt•ypd to appellant by warranty de€d, her 
intc·n·:-;t in thl' property (R.16) (Tr. 80). 
On .\pril :2~). 1963 a Decree of Adoption was made 
and t•nkn•d in whieh Appellant and Respondent adopted 
,Jlwklyn .. \11 of appellant's stocks and bonds which the 
partil':-; held a~ joint tenants, were transferred to appel-
lant alone (Tr. C>-t-Tr. 80). Now with all of his property 
n•(•oupt·d, the appellant had the decree of divorce set 
nsidl' and the marital relationship was resumed. 
Thel"t•aftPr the marriage continued and shortly before 
tlll' filing of the present action, Appellant transferred 
$:!.:-)llll.OO front his own bank account and placed it in the 
name of .J acklyn ( Tr. 53). Shortly after this Appellant 
then commenced the present divorce action. 
All the way through the trial Appellant exhibited 
a great concern for his money and property and a fear 
that Ht·~lHHldl•nt, as his wife, 1night share in some of it 
( Tr. -!0--H, 3G-3 7). Appellant contends that Respondent 
aid not treat this young lady who was eighteen years 
of age properly and that she quarreled with him over 
money ( Tr. 37). 
Respondent, on the other hand, in support of her 
counterclaim, contends that ~\ppellant treated her cruel-
ly and ~truck her on a nlunber of occasions (Tr. 87). She 
tt·~tified that she had gotten along with J acklyn and 
purchased gifts for her (Tr. 81), (the young lady Jacklyn 
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(Tr. 71)) and made clothes for her. Appellants testified 
that she had worked during the entire 1narriage, and took 
home about $250.00 per month; that out of this money 
she had paid her own doctor bills and bought groceries 
(Tr. 88) and used all of her money in the home (Tr. 9±) 
(Tr. 40). 
Based upon this evidence the Court dismissed Plain-
tiff's complaint, granted Defendant a divorce on her 
counterclaim and awarded her $2500.00 in lieu of ali-
mony, together with $350.00 as counsel fees. 
The real property, together with all his stocks, bonds, 




THE REOORD SUSTAINS THE DISTRICT COURT IN 
AWARDING RESPONDENT A LUMP SUM IN LIEU OF 
ALIMONY. 
Throughout the trial it appears that Appellant was 
very much concerned about parting with any of his world-
ly goods or permitting Respondent to participate in any 
kind of security that he might be able to give her. This 
attitude apparently was with him even prior to the mar-
riage, when he took Respondent to his attorney and there 
she, without advice of counsel, entered into the anti-
nuptial agreement (R. 16). 
Appellant here complains that the Court erred in 
awarding a lump sum in lieu of alimony. In the case 
of Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, (176 P. 2nd 144) 
at page 87, the Court said: 
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"The marriage In the case at bar lasted ap-
proximately 68 days, both parties are in their 
Ntrly middle ages, each is cOining out of the ex-
l>Pl'il'IH'l' approxi1nately as he or she went into it 
as far a~ health and job expectations are concern-
t-o. Both parties had substantial property to be-
gin with and Pxeept for the $1800.00 awarded Mrs. 
J<,oreman approximately $1400.00 of which came 
from tlw property .Mr. Foreman had prior to his 
marriagt>, they are separated with their treasures 
$425.00 gross and $365.57 net. ~Irs. Foreman's 
$25.00. The Court found that the conduct of the 
DefPndant, respondent, has caused the Plaintiff 
great mental and physical distress and illness, and 
that her conduct has not caused him any distress. 
The parties litigated fully the question of fault in 
thl' east' at bar-a material distinction between 
tlw case at bar and Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255. 
G7 P. ~d 265. 
And we state in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah at 
page ~tiO, 67 P. 2nd page 267 : 
'In cases where her health has suffered 
or his conduct has been such as to justify, 
alimony for a period may be granted.' 
Under the reasoning of the above cited case 
if alilnony for a period is proper a lump sum 
award could be properly made ... " 
The matter of a hunp smn payment in lieu of ali-
mony is a discretionary n1atter with the trial Court. 
In :27 .\. C.J.S. 1079 it is stated as follows: 
"It has been held to be proper and the better 
practirP, at least with respect to some situations 
to award alimony in gross, as where the divorce 
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is an absolute one, restoring the parties to t1Jl' 
state of unmarried persons, where the marriage 
was of particularly short duration, where there 
being no children, the lives of the parties will 
diverge, where the ·wife has brought money or 
property to the husband, or where property has 
been accumulated by the joint efforts of the hus-
band and wife. It must be clear that the husband 
has assets sufficient to pay the gross award. 
"In the final analysis, the question of whether 
or not an allowance of a gross sum should be made 
must be determined by the facts of the particular 
case, having due regard to the best interest of 
the parties and the husband's financial ability to 
respond to an award in gross ; and in general, 
where the award may be by alimony in gross 
or by periodic alimony the award will depend 
on the sound discretion of the court under the 
particular circumstances. Accordingly, where 
alimony in gross is awarded, it is especially jm-
portant that every fact material to the deter-
mination of a just award should be before the 
Court." 
In the instant case the Court took into consideration 
all of the circumstances including Appellant's ability to 
pay and the fact that he had acquired a considerable 
amount of property, although he had 1nost of it when 
he married Respondent. (Tr. R. 16) The fact that Re-
spondent worked and contributed her small amount to the 
welfare of the family was also considered by the Court. 
In Sorenson. v. Sorenson, 14 U. 2nd :2-1, 376 P. 2nd 
547, Mr. Justice Wade said in the opinion: 
"Unless there is a manifest injustice and in-
equity or a clear abuse of discretion, this Court 
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will not substitute its judg1nent for that of the 
trial Court." 
.\vvonling to his brief Appellant not only objects 
to tlw award of a lun1p sum in lieu of alimony, but, to 
tht~ payment to Respondent of anything at all. Even 
though she worked, during nearly all of the marriage 
antl turnl'd ht>r money to the payment of household obli-
gation~, and to the paying of her own doctor bills (Tr. 
~~) .. \ppellant is unwilling to give her anything for her 
efforts in the marriage and would like her turned out 
with nothing, he to have and keep all of the benefits of 
her labors during the 1narriage. In other words, the obli-
gation to support his wife during the marriage meant 
nothing to hhn. Appellants points out that she is in good 
health and able to make her own way and therefore the 
Court should turn her out with nothing. 
Judge X or~Pth considered all of the facts before him 
including the length of the marriage, the condition of 
tlw parties and the financial ability of the Appellant 
to at least in part con1pensate her for her efforts in the 
marriage. (Tr. 101) 
"~ P submit that there has been no abuse of discre-
tion by the award to Respondent of a lump sum which 
Appellant has been ordered to pay in lieu of alimony. 
In the east> of Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 
~~~) P. :!nd tiS, 34 ALR 2nd 305, "Ch. J. Wolfe" 
.. The modern view is that the Court should 
In doing equity, take into consideration all of 
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the circumstances and withhold or decree ali-
money and distribute the property in accord-
ance with those circumstances." 
The Court because of the short duration of the marriage 
did not saddle appellant with a permanent Order for pay-
ment of alimony. The award as made was commensurate 
with the parties standard of living and the Court took 
into consideration the contribution which Respondent 
had made to the marriage by way of money. She testified 
that she had contributed her pay check to the marriage 
in addition to serving Appellant as a faithful wife (Tr. 
88). The divorce was not of her making, but rather was 
Appellant's idea. Now he would like to cast her off like 
an old suit of clothes and replace her with a new one at 
little or no cost for the exchange. This was all visible 
and apparent to Judge Nor seth at the trial, and was all 
undoubtedly considered by him in making his decision. 
BOINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE 
EVIDENCE IN AWARDING RESPONDENT A DIVORCE 
FROM APPELLANT. 
(A) THE DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
<B) THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE OF THE EX-
TREME MENTAL ANGUISH SUFFERED BY RESPOND-
ENT. 
A. The trial Court had both of the parties before it and 
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of each of 
them. 
This Honorable Court has held that a wife is entitled 
to a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty on much 
10 
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lNiS Pvidt>rwt~ than it will require of the husband who must 
::;how a somewhat aggravated case. 
In the case of Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P. 781, 
Ch. J. Straup said: 
"Each case must depend upon its own facts 
and circumstances. The adjudged cases show that 
courts, on the ground of cruelty, grant the wife a 
decree on 1nuch less evidence than they do the 
husband. That rests on sound principles, for acts 
and conduct on the part of a husband may well 
constitute cruelty to the wife, causing her great 
mental distress, when similar acts and conduct 
on her part may not constitute cruelty to him, 
or cause him great mental distress. Before a de-
cree is granted the husband on such ground, it 
ought to be a somewhat aggravated case." 
This was followed and quoted in Hyrup v. Hyrup, 
66 Ftah 580, 245 P. 335. 
Again in Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 466, 61 P.2nd 
601, this Court citing the Hyrup case (supra) states it 
as follows: 
Moffatt J . 
.. Two people who cannot adjust themselves 
should not by the court be required to maintain a 
relationship that has become intolerable to them. 
X o such situation is revealed by the allegations 
of the complaint. Some nagging and fault find-
ing by each spouse is to be expected, and the hus-
band being the stronger, ought to take and for-
bear much of it with patience * * * what may be 
cruelty causing great mental distress in one case 
11 
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may not be in another. Each case must depend 
upon its own facts and circumstances. The ad-
judged cases show that courts, on the ground of 
cruelty, grant the wire a decree on 1nuch less evi-
dence than they do the husband. That rests on 
sound principles, for acts and conduct on the part 
of a husband may well constitute cruelty to 
the wife causing her great mental distress, 
when similar acts and conduct on her part may 
not constitute cruelty to him, or cause him great 
mental distress. Before a decree is granted the 
husband on such gound, it ought to be a some-
what aggravated case." Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 
158 P. 781; Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P. 
335. 
See also Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 52 P. 2nd 
428; Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 112 Utah 31, 1184 P. 2nd 
670. 
In the recent case of Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 
2nd, 153, 360 P. 2nd 923, this Court held, (Callister, Jus-
tice): 
"(1) What constitutes mental cruelty must 
be ascertained from the facts of each case. 
Whether Defendant's conduct was cruel and 
whether it caused plaintiff to suffer great mental 
distress, can only be determined in light of the 
sensibility of this particular plaintiff. Persons' 
sensibilities may vary due to their different de-
grees of intelligence, refinement, delicacy of 
health, etc. For this reason, the same conduct may 
constitute mental cruelty in one case and not in 
another. The ultimate answer depends not so 
much on defendant's conduct, but rather on the 
effect such conduct had upon the plaintiff. 
12 
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( ~) An additional factor of importance is 
wla·ther the granting of the divorce would con-
flict with the public interest our divorce statutes 
wPre designed to protect. The public has an in-
tPrPst in the preservation of marriages in which 
t lw parties have mutual love and respect, and 
where the circumstances promote the happiness 
wPlfan•, health and morality of the parties and of 
tlwir children. However, there is no public inter-
P~t in the preservation of a marriage where one 
of the parties can no longer endure the relation-
ship without impairing his or her health; or 
where the conduct of one party has deteriorated 
the relationship to the extent that the parties will 
no longer continue cohabitation, and the marriage 
exists only in name but not in fact." 
In determining these factors the trial judge has 
tlw advantage of hearing the testimony and observing 
the demeanor of the witnesses and unless there is an 
abn~P of discretionary powers, this Court has held it will 
not disturb the ruling of the trial Court. Weiss v. Weiss, 
111 Utah 353,179 P. 2nd 1005. 
In Lmclor v. Lawlor, 121 Utah 201, 240 P.2nd 271, 
this Court held (Wade Justice) : 
"This court is reluctant to modify a divorce 
decree because the evidence is contradictory and 
the trial court having seen and heard the wit-
nesses is more able to determine their credibility 
than we are. Also, in the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we do not disturb the property divi-
sion. 'y e have carefully read the transcript and 
feel that the court's decision is fairly sustained 
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In considering the testin1ony the Trial Court had to 
conclude that from the very beginning of his relation-
ship with respondent appellant never at any time acted 
in good faith. 
The evidence therefore weighed heavily in favor of 
respondent on her counterclaim. 
The terms and conditions which appellant imposed 
on respondent by his antenuptial agreement, (R. 16) to-
gether with the terms and conditions therein contained 
and the circumstances under which he persuaded re-
spondent to go to his own lawyer's office and enter into 
it (Tr. 30-74) should give any trier of the facts a true 
insight into the small, shabby manner in which this 
man's mind worked. This Court may observe from exam-
ination of the record what a difficulty appellant's coun-
sel had to get him to state anything of any consequence 
whatsoever as to what caused him to file this action. 
(Tr.14-15-16-17-18-19) 
In appelant's brief, In an attempt to discredit re-
spondent, he states that respondent had had "some asso-
ciation with her ex-husband." Transcript 21: 
"Q. At this time did you dial the phone, or did 
you see your wife dial your phone~ 
A. I did, yes. 
Q. Who did she ask for~ 
A. She asked for her boy. 
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Q. All right, and then Eddie carne to the phone~ 
.\. He did not con1e to the phone. She talked to 
her ex-husband. 
Q. And that is what you are complaining about 
today ~ Is that it 1 
~Lr. Richards: That isn't proper voir dire. 
Mr. Duncan' : All right, 
B 1 .Mr. Richards : 
Q. Now did this cause a problem between you 
and your wife~ The fact she was talking 
to her ex-husband~ 
A. I told her to knock it off, and I believe she 
cut it out. They went back together again, 
so-Her ex-husband and his wife went back 
together again, and then she never called, 
that I know of, anymore." 
This is a grabbing of straws when by appellant's 
own testimony, she quit talking to her ex-husband when 
he complained. 
Respondent's concern for her own son and appel-
lant's refusal to consider her desires in regard to the boy 
along with his insistence that the 18-year old young 
woman, Jacklyn, whom appellant had raised to have 
t'n'ry privilege of a natural born daughter, while he 
turned respondent's son out. (Trans. 90), caused addi-
tional friction and clearly demonstrates appellant's one-
sided thinking. 
"Q. X ow one other thing. At the time you were 
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Q. And why does your son not live there now1 
A. Because we were always arguing, it seemPd 
like, and part of it was because he just-well, 
he did not want hin1 in the house. 
Q. Did Mr. Peters say anything like that~ 
A. Yes. He said that he was not welcome. 
Q. Did you discuss his living there before you 
were married~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did l\lr. Peters say he could do~ 
A. He said he could live there. In fact he was 
planning on building a home, and had even 
chosen a bedroom Eddie was supposed to 
occupy." 
There was considerable testimony about Mrs. Peters 
wanting to be alone some times with appellant and the 
fact that he wanted J acklyn along all the time. 
As to the name calling appellant testifed that re-
spondent called J acklyn a "whore," but respondent denies 
this and states the only time this word was used in the 
home was when appellant called her one. (Tr. 80) 
All through the trial appellant, by his own testi-
mony and his conduct appears penurious, stingy and 
totally unable to accept respondent fully as his wife 
and permit her to share in the fmnily affairs, especially 
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"Q. \\~ell, yon took thi~ titlt> as joint tenants, isn't 
that right! 
.\. rrhat was tlH' way it-I didn't know what I 
was doing. 
Q. That wa~ the only thing that bothered you, 
that caused the first divorce 1 
~\. That'~ right. 
Q. All right. Now she conveyed all this property 
to yon, didn't she 1 
A. Yt·~. 
Q. ~o that it's your position now that she doesn't 
have any interest in that home 1 
A. That's right. 
Q. Not even a dower right, is that right 1 
A. She hasn't put a dollar in it. 
Q. By the way, she has worked most of her mar-
riage hasn't she 1 
A. Quite a lot of it, yes." 
The record bears this out completely. (Trans. 39-40) 
B. .:\s to evidence being offered by respondent 
showing that appellant's conduct resulted in extreme 
mental anguish, there were numerous quarrels, but in 
each easp respondent attempted to reconcile them. After 
the first divorce she even transferred all interest to him 
in his stoeks, bonds and real property which she held 
with him as joint tenants, all to make the "marriage 
work." ( Tr. ~~) ( ...:-\.lso see record and file no. 39985 of 
t'i rst divorce action between the parties) : 
17 
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"Q. Now I direct your attention to after this first 
Decree of Divorce was entered. Thereafter 
you got together, didn't you 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now did he come to you, or did you come to 
him1 
A. He came down to my apartment. 
Q. What did he say 1 
A. Well, we would sit and talk about these 
differences that were upsetting him so. 
Q. Give us the substance of the conversation, 
as near as you can remember it. 
A. Well, we were talking about reconciling, and 
it seemed like the only thing that was really 
upsetting him was that the house and the 
stocks were still as joint tenants. 
Q. What did you say to him 1 
A. I said: 'Well, if that is your problem, if we 
reconcile we'll have a will made and then I'll 
sign the house and the things back to you. If 
this is what will make the marriage work.' 
Q. Is that why you signed 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you want to 1nake this marriage work1 
A. I certainly did. 
Q. And did you exhibit any love or affection 
for your husband at that time 1 
A. Well, sure." 
On the other hand Appellant was cruel with respond-
ent. There was some evidence of condonation from time 
18 
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to tillH', but IH'Vl'r, did they lin· together as husband and 
wtl't•, uftt•r tlw b(•at ing ht- gave her and in which she 
l'allSl'(l tht• police to hl' eallP<L (Tr. 87) The bruises were 
t•xhibitt•d in Court at the trial about three weeks later 
('rr. -W). 
\\" e submit that respondent was not only subjected 
to l'onstant mental annoyances from appellant but that 
ht• also subjPeted her to physical mistreatment when he 
felt the m·l·asion warranted it. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARDS OF ALIMONY AND 
.\ TTORNEY'S FEES PENDING APPEAL WAS PROPER AND 
I~ ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTE. 
::o-:>-:.~, Utah Code Annotate: 
"Temporary alimony and suit money. The 
court may order either party to pay the clerk a 
sum of nwney for the separate support and 
maintenance of the adverse party and the chil-
dren and to enable such party to prosecute or 
defendant the action." 
This suit was of the Appellant's own doing. He com-
menced it twice . 
. \fter the Pntry of judg1nent Plaintiff and Appellant 
herein st'l'Yt•d X otice of his Appeal to this Court, but 
before the record had been transferred to the Supreme 
Cnnrt. the Defendant and Respondent petitioned the Dis-
trict Court for an award of temporary alimony pending 
the disposition of the action in the Supreme Court and 
for a reasonable smu as counsel fees for the use and bene-
19 
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fit of Respondent's attorney in the preparation and 
defense of the action in the Supreme Court. This was 
filed February 5, 1964 and the transcript and records 
were not received in the Supreme Court until March 18, 
1964. The District Court thereafter awarded Defendant, 
Respondent herein, $50.00 per month as alimony pend-
ing the disposition of the action in the Supreme Court 
and $350.00 as counsel fees for the use and benefit of her 
attorney in preparing and presenting her defense in the 
Supreme iCourt. 
The matter of attorney's fees is also a matter of dis-
cretion with the Court. 
Again in the case of Alldredge v. Aldredge (supra) 
this Court held that even though a husband is granted 
a Decree of Divorce on the ground of mental cruelty 
and a wife's counterclaim is dismissed does not preelude 
an allowance to the wife of attorney's fees. 
Ch. J. Wolfe': 
"The general rule is that a wife is a privi-
leged suitor in divorce cases and if she is without 
income competent for her support, and the main-
tenance of the suit, living separated from her hus-
band, the Court will allow her ali1nony pendente 
lite and 1noney to carry on her suit without in-
quiry into the merits. 
"The reason for permitting a wife suit money 
to defend an action for divorce rests on the ground 
that the wife normally has no separate estate 
from which to pay for bringing or defending the 
action. This is the situation in the case at hand. 
Not to allow the wife expenses and counsel fees 
would in the majority of cases work an injustice 
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hy dPnying her the power to enforce any marital 
right~ which ~hP Inay have. Here, as in the case 
of alimony, gross or im1noral conduct may cause 
n denial o I' attorney's fpp~, but such conduct is not 
found in this case. It was error for the court to 
(ll'nV tlw defendant counsel fees which are a part 
of her costs pendente lite and which could have 
hPPn rt>quired before the suit was concluded." 
In JJ"cis8 v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P 2nd 1005, 
~lr .• Ju~tieL' \Yolfe writing the opinion stated: 
"The statute does not contemplate that 
awards for expenses of suit or for temporary ali-
mony should be made only in those cases where 
till' "adverse party" (usually the wife) is desti-
tute or practically so. It contemplates such 
awards when in the sound discretion of the court 
the eircumstances of the parties are such that in 
fairness to the wife, she should be given financial 
a~~i8tanre by her husband in her prosecution or 
(ldPn8e of the divorce action, and for her support 
during its pendency." 
The language of the Weiss case was requoted in the 
l'll~P of Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P. 2nd 650, 
adding further : 
"The rights of the wife to attorney's fees 
when she is forced to go to court to enforce 
a divorce decree should not be different from 
those of one who seeks temporary alimony. The 
court did not err in granting attorney's fees to 
n•spondent." 
At the time the Order was made Plaintiff and appel-
lant herein had merely filed his notice of appeal and the 
fill'S and records were not sent to the Supreme Court 
untilJO days later. 
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We submit there was nothing at that ti1ne before this 
Honorable Court and had respondent waited during that 
time she would have suffered undue delay and hardship. 
Under Rule 73 (G) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the District Court may in its discretion and with or with-
out notice extend the time for filing the record on appeal, 
if its order for extension is made before the expiration 
of the period for filing as originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order. This time also could be 
extended up by three months. 
In Peterson v. Ohio Copper, 71 Utah ±±4, 2G6 P. 1050 
this Honorable Court stated: 
"Whenever the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court is involved, as it is by the filing and service 
of the Notice of Appeal, the trial Court is shorn 
of its jurisdiction, except as to proceedings in aid 
of the appeal." 
We submit that the order of the trial court for 
temporary alimony pending the disposition of the appeal 
was in aid of the appeal and to avoid an undue hardship. 
This was also true of the matter of the award of counsel 
fese for the use and benefit of respondent's attorney in 
preparing and presenting her appeal. 
As to appelant's statement in his brief that respond-
ent has not demonstrated a need for the relief granted, 
that is temporary alimony and attorney's fees on appeal, 
we again submit the case of Weiss v. Weiss (supra) 
wherein the Court stated that the statute did not contem-
22 
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plute award:-; for PX 1 H'nsps of suit or for temporary ali-
tunny slwuld hP made only in those cases where the 
"tulvPrsP party'' ( u:-;ually the 'vife) is destitute or prac-
tit·nlly so. It contemplatP~ such awards when in the 
sound diserPtion of the court the circumstances of the 
pnrtit•s an• sueh that in fairness to the wife she should 
ht- givl'n financial assistance by her husband in her 
prost•eut ion or as in this case her defense of the divorce 
udion, and for her support during its pendency. 
~\~nin, in this n1atter, we submit the trial Court 
propt·t·ly PXPrcised its discretionary powers and there 
has hPen no showing of any abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
Ht>~pondent heartily disagrees with appellant's 
statement in his brief that the case at bar demonstrates 
"the unfortunate attitude of courts to treat divorce cases 
in nn off hand 1nanner." 
Rt>spondent sub1nits that the trial Court considered 
thoroughly the underlying cause of the divorce which is 
born out by the record, that appellant, at the outset 
and before the marriage, planned to take what pleasures 
and conYeniences he might enjoy from respondent and in 
return giYe nothing. His penurious, selfish, distrustful 
attittHh·. we submit was the sole cause of the marital 
troubk. The trial Court was more than fair and liberal 
to him. He was not saddled with alimony payments, but 
''"a~ required to repay respondent only a relatively 
~mall amount for the time, money and energy respondent 
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had given him in a futile attempt to make the 1narriage 
work. Under the circumstances which he had created 
from the beginning we submit Respondent is entitled to 
have the Judgment and D·ecree affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LaMAR DUNCAN 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
208 Phillips Petroleum Bldg. 
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